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Abstract. The Grid security mechanisms were designed under the assumption that users would 
submit their jobs directly to the Grid gatekeepers. Many groups are however starting to use 
pilot-based infrastructures, where users submit jobs to a centralized queue and are successively 
transferred  to  the  Grid  resources  by  the  pilot  infrastructure.  While  this  approach  greatly 
improves the user experience, it does introduce several security and policy issues, the more 
serious being the lack of system level protection between the users and the inability for Grid 
sites  to  apply fine  grained  authorization  policies.  One possible  solution  to  the  problem is 
provided by gLExec, a X.509 aware suexec derivative. By using gLExec, the pilot workflow 
becomes as secure as any traditional one.
1. Introduction
The Grid security mechanisms[1] were designed under the assumption that users would submit their 
jobs directly to the Grid gatekeepers. However, for the past decade direct submission has never been 
the main submission mechanism for the majority of the users. With the proliferation of Grid sites, 
most  users  prefer  to  submit  their  jobs  to  some sort  of  intermediate  queue  and  have  a  workload 
management system (WMS) optimize the distribution of their jobs among the Grid sites. 
Over the past few years,  many groups have started to use pilot-based WMSes, prized for their 
ability to keep Grid-wide fair share between their users. These systems do not submit the jobs directly 
to the Grid gatekeeper, but send only so-called pilot jobs. Once a pilot job starts on a Grid resource, it 
will fetch a real user job and execute it. The traditional Grid authentication, authorization and mapping 
infrastructure is not used in the process, which has deep security implications, both for Grid sites and 
the WMS administrators.
gLExec, a X.509 aware suexec derivative is presented in this paper as a possible solution to the 
security  problem.  The  advantages  and  the  limits  of  this  approach  are  described,  as  well  as  the 
experience gained from the initial deployment at the Fermi National Laboratory.
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2. The security problems of the Pilot infrastructure in the current Grid model
In the current Grid model, the site Grid gatekeeper is responsible for authenticating and authorizing a 
user and to convert the user's Grid identity into a local one. If a user is accepted, his job is submitted to 
a local batch system using this local identity. When the job reaches a worker node (i.e. a compute 
resource) it runs using this local identity. Since different users are typically mapped to different local 
accounts, system level protection mechanisms prevent different user's jobs to interfere with each other. 
See figure 1 for an overview.
Figure 1. Traditional Grid security overview
When pilot based WMSes are used, the forkflow is quite different. Here, users submit jobs to a 
WMS specific batch system, and their presence triggers the pilot factory to send pilot jobs to various 
Grid sites. The pilot jobs then follow the path user jobs would, and eventually they start on a set of 
worker nodes. Each pilot job then pulls a user job and executes it. See figure 2 for an overview. 
This modus operandi has several security drawbacks: 
• From the user point of view, all the system level protections are lost, since all users run under 
the pilot local identity. Any other job of the same WMS can interfere with his own job, if 
running on the same worker node. 
• From  the  WMS  administrator  point  of  view,  there  is  no  system  level  protection  against 
malicious users, since both the pilot and the user run under the same, pilot local identity. A 
malicious  user  can  impersonate  the  pilot  infrastructure,  completely  breaking  any  security 
model the the pilot infrastructure has put in place. 
• From the Grid site point of view, most authentication and authorization mechanisms are lost. 
The site can only allow allow all users to run, by allowing the pilot job, or prevent all of them, 
by  denying  entrance  to  the  pilot  jobs.  Moreover,  if  pilot  jobs  are  allowed,  no  user  level 
accounting is available.
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Figure 2. The Pilot workflow in the traditional Grid security environment 
It is worth noting that the pilot based WMSes are not introducing the above mentioned security 
problems because they want to; they do it because there is no site provided security tool on the worker 
nodes. If there were one, most pilot based WMS infrastructures would be more than happy to use it.
3. Pilot security with gLExec
One security tool that can be installed on the worker nodes is gLExec, a X.509 aware derivative of the 
Apache suexec. gLExec is a lightweight privileged executable that, given a X.509 proxy certificate, 
authenticates and authorizes the  user  and runs  the  associated payload under the appropriate  local 
identity.
Once  gLExec  is  integrated  in  the  the  Grid  security  infrastructure  and  deployed  on  the  Grid 
compute resources, pilots can use it to run users' jobs under the appropriate local identities, solves all 
the above mentioned security concerns: 
• Users get back system level protection, shielding them from other users interference.
• The  pilot  jobs  also  gets  back  the  system  level  protection,  shielding  the  WMS  security 
infrastructure from malicious users.
• The Grid site administrators set the local policies, and are guaranteed that unwanted users jobs 
will not run on their resources. Local accounting can now properly distinguish resources used 
by pilots from those used by the final users. 
See figure 3 for a schematic overview. Please notice that gLExec behaves just like a gatekeeper, just 
running on each and every worker node.
4. Remaining problems with the Pilot infrastructure
While gLExec can solve the basic security issues introduced by the use of pilot infrastructure, there 
are still several concerns that remain unsolved.
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Figure 3. Pilot workflow with gLExec
4.1. Security of the Pilot infrastructure itself
Grid sites are rightfully worried about the trustfulness of the pilot infrastructure.  The pilot WMS 
software was not provided, or even reviewed, by any Grid body the site trusts, and there is no explicit 
trust relationship in place between the WMS software providers and the Gird site, neither is there one 
between the  WMS administrators  and  the  site.  gLExec  by itself  obviously cannot  help  solve this 
problem.
To be correct, the problem of trustfulness is not limited to pilot based WMSes. Any WMS that 
handles user jobs has the same issues. So the problem, although pertinent, is outside the scope of this 
paper.
4.2. Ensuring pilots do use gLExec
Installing gLExec does not force pilot jobs to use it. Moreover, it is technically impossible to force 
pilot jobs to use it, since a pilot job is technically no different than any regular user job. So Grid sites 
are rightfully worried about this.
However, the problem can be solved at the policy level. A site policy that holds the  pilot job 
owners responsible for every action a user job performs unless they use gLExec can provide the Grid 
site with strong legal protection and be a strong incentive for pilot based WMS administrators to use 
gLExec compliant pilot jobs.
4.3. Nested gLExec invocations
Pilot jobs need to control their children and do proper cleanup after they are done. When gLExec is 
used, pilots need to invoke gLExec to perform these actions. However, if any child uses gLExec itself, 
the pilot may not be able to control those grandchildren.
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The problem is that the pilot does not own the credentials that were used by its child to invoke 
gLExec,  so it  cannot use gLExec to  act  upon the processes and files  resulting from such action. 
Although the pilot has access to all the files of the child, it would have a hard time find out which one 
was used to invoke gLExec. Moreover, a malicious users could delete such credentials after calling 
gLExec, making the process completely impossible. See figure 4 for an overview.
There is currently no knows solution for the problem of nested gLExec invocations. However, no 
known uses cases exist today, so nested gLExec invocations could be banned until a solution is found. 
To prevent abuse, a privileged monitoring tool could detect and kill any process trying to use nested 
gLExec invocations. 
Figure 4. Nested gLExec invocations Figure 5. gLExec with GUMS
 5. gLExec deployment
gLExec has been deployed on the Fermi National Laboratory (Fermilab) worker nodes since October 
2006, and has been used by the CDF pilot based WMS, called the GlideCAF since then.
Fermilab is an OSG site, and thus uses GUMS[2] for user authorization and mapping. GUMS is a 
central service that can serve concurrently several clients. While its original goal was to unify the 
mapping between compute resources and data handling resources, having a centralized service proved 
to be extremely useful with the introduction of gLExec. Having to configure each and every worker 
node's policy would have been a nightmare, with GUMS, installing gLExec adds almost no additional 
complexity to the system. See figure 5 for a schematic view.
gLExec monitoring has also been interface to GRATIA, the OSG accounting system, providing 
local system administrator proper accounting of final user activity.
gLExec, together with the GUMS plugin been incorporated into VDT as of version 1.8. Moreover, 
OSG is planning on integrating it into its stack in the upcoming version 0.8.
Conclusions
Pilot  jobs  are  becoming increasingly popular  in  the  Grid  world  and  the  traditional  Grid  security 
mechanisms are not able to handle them. Installing gLExec on the worker nodes provides a way to 
solve most of the security problems introduced by the pilot concept.
gLExec has been integrated with the OSG security mechanism and has been extensively tested at 
Fermilab. The expected wide deployment on OSG will provide a first reasonably secure pilot friendly 
Grid environment.
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